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ABSTRACT 
This study empirically investigates the impact of the federal budget deficit on the nominal interest rate yield on 
high grade long term tax free municipal bonds. Within a system that includes income tax rates, 
international capital flows, and the primary budget deficit, which excludes net interest payments by the 
Treasury, cointegration and error-correction model estimation leads to the conclusion that the primary 
budget deficit acted to raise this interest rate yield over the 1973-1996 study period but that the causality was 
not bi-directional. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the U.S., there was a brief experience with federal government budget surpluses during the 1998-
2001 period. However, given the 2001 recession, sluggish economic growth since 2001, and budgetary 
demands involving proposed further income tax cuts on the one hand and the "war on terrorism" in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 on the other hand, the specter of 
federal government budget deficits, potentially huge ones, has raised its ugly head once again. As 
Alan Krueger (2003) observes, budget deficits have re-emerged as a major economic concern. 
The impact of deficits on interest rates has been studied extensively [Barth, Iden and Russek (1984; 
1985), Barth, Iden, Russek, and Wohar (1989), Carlson and Spencer (1975), Cebula (1988; 1997), 
Cebula and Belton (1993), Cukierman and Meltzer (1989), Feldstein and Eckstein (1970), Findlay 
(1990), Hoelscher (1983; 1986), Holloway (1988), Johnson (1992), Ostrosky (1990), Saltz (1998), 
Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti (1990), Tanzi (1985), Zahid (1988)]. These studies typically are 
couched within IS-LM or loanable funds models or variants thereof. Many of these studies find that 
the government budget deficit acts to raise longer term rates of interest while not significantly 
affecting shorter term rates of interest. Since capital formation is presumably much more affected by 
long term than by short term rates, the inference has often been made that budget deficits may lead 
to "crowding out" [Carlson and Spencer (1975), Cebula (1985), Krueger (2003)]. 
A large portion of this literature ignores net international capital flows, thereby neglecting the interest-
rate impact of such flows in the global economy and raising the question of a possible omitted -
variable bias [Penner (1987)]. Moreover, an even larger portion of this literature ignores income tax 
rates, thereby raising the question of omitted-variable bias on another level [Cf. see Cebula and Belton 
(1993) and Tanzi (1985)]. This omission seems especially serious since such tax rates arguably can 
profoundly influence private sector spending and savings decisions, and hence tax collections, 
unemployment, unemployment benefits, and budget deficits. 
Potentially more important, the deficit measures adopted most commonly in this literature, the N.I.P.A. 
total budget deficit, the structural budget deficit, and the cyclical budget deficit, all include interest 
payments on the national debt. This presence of interest payments on the national debt in the budget-
deficit measure raises the possibility of a fundamental misspecification. Namely, the interest rate is 
typically treated in these studies as the "dependent" variable whereas interest payments on the 
national debt are also a major component of arguably the key explanatory variable, i.e., the budget 
deficit, with causality typically characterized as flowing from the deficit to the interest rate. Thus, 
interest rates appear on both sides of the estimating equation. To address this problem, this study adopts 
the primary budget deficit, which excludes interest rate payments from the deficit measure. 
This study seeks to investigate the budget deficit/long-term tax free interest rate relationship after 
accounting for these three potential problems. The emphasis on the tax-free interest rate yield reflects in 
part a relative neglect of this interest rate measure in this literature. Emphasis on the tax free yield also 
reflects the need for policymakers to understand better the impact of their policies on state and local 
government entities, entities whose debt lacks the broader financial market appeal of U.S. Treasury 
issues. The study adopts cointegration and error-correction estimation to investigate the possibility that 
the direction of causality between federal budget deficits and the long term tax free interest rate may be 
bi-directional rather than simply bi-directional. In addition, the model formally adopts the primary 
budget deficit as the deficit variable so as to avoid a possible misspecification. Using the primary deficit 
should permit an analysis of whether there is an actual economic impact of the deficit on the long term 
interest rate and not merely an accounting relationship reflecting the "mechanical" payment of interest 
on the national debt. Finally, the model includes net international capital inflows as well as a federal 
personal income tax rate measure so as to avoid omitted-variable bias. Using seasonally adjusted 
quarterly data, the study period is 1973.2-1996.4. We begin with 1973.2 because this is the quarter by 
which the system of fixed exchange rates (Bretton Woods) had effectively collapsed. Thus, over the 
entire study period, there effectively is a uniform exchange rate system in place. Furthermore, since 
there was no entirely satisfactory way to allow for the numerous provisions of and complex impacts of 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the study period ends in 1996.4. 
Section 2 provides the framework for the empirical analysis. Section 3 defines the variables in the 
empirical model and describes the data, including the measurement of the expected inflation. Sections 4 
and 5 provide the empirical results, whereas an overview of the study findings is found in Section 6. 
2. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK 
In developing the underlying framework for the empirical analysis, we first consider the following 
intertemporal government budget constraint: 
NDt+1= NDt + Gt + Ft + ARtNDt – Tt        [1] 
where: 
NDt+1 = the national debt in period t+1 
NDt = the national debt in period t 
Gt = government purchases in period t 
Ft = government non-interest transfer payments in period t 
ARt = average effective interest rate on the national debt in period t 
Tt = government tax and other revenues in period t 
 
The total government budget deficit in period t (TDt) is the difference between NDt+1 and NDt: 
TDt = NDt+1 - NDt = Gt + Ft + ARtNDt - Tt       [2] 
Rather than focusing on the total deficit, this study focuses on the primary budget deficit, which excludes 
interest payments made by the Treasury. The primary deficit (PDt) is given by: 
PDt = TDt - ARtNDt = NDt+1 - NDt - ARtNDt = Gt + Ft - Tt     [3] 
One can incorporate I, the federal income tax rate; M2, the growth rate of the real M2 money supply; TF, 
the nominal average interest rate yield on tax free long term high grade municipal bonds; and EAR, the ex 
ante real short term taxable interest rate yield, into the model, as follows: 
F = f(M2, TF,...), fm2 < 0, fTF > 0        [4] 
T = g(M2, I, TF, EAR,...),gM2 >0,g1 >=< 0,gTF < 0,gEAR > 0     [5] 
G = h(TF, ...), hTF >=0         [6] 
 
It is hypothesized in this study that plausible factors influencing F, T, and G may well include long-term 
interest rates, such as the nominal interest rate yield on long term municipals (TF). If TF were to rise, as a 
practical matter, then other markets competing for long term loanable funds, such as the corporate bond and 
home mortgage markets, would presumably be faced with higher nominal long term rates as well, due to 
financial market competition. To the extent that these higher long-term nominal interest rates lead to reduced 
real economic activity, tax collections might fall and government transfers might increase. Even discretionary 
government purchases might be increased and/or tax rates decreased to offset any recessionary trend, 
especially in an election year. The potential outcome: an increased primary deficit. 
Based on the conventional wisdom, ceteris paribus, a rise in M2 is expected (albeit with a time lag) to 
accelerate economic activity and therefore to decrease F and to increase T, thereby lowering the primary 
deficit, PD. In addition, in theory, the higher the income tax rate, the higher the level of tax collections, ceteris 
paribus, and hence the lower the primary deficit. On the other hand, to the extent that a higher income tax 
rate either reduces real purchases by reducing disposable real income and/or induces income tax evasion 
[Feige (1994)1, tax collections could actually decline. Accordingly, the net impact of 1 on PD is unclear. 
Finally, the higher the ex ante real short term taxable interest rate, EAR, the higher the aggregate level of 
taxable income and hence the higher the level of tax collections should be, ceteris paribus. Thus, the 
primary deficit is likely to be a function of M2, I, TF, and EAR, such that: 
PD = j(M2, I, TF, EAR,...) [7] 
where: 
jM2 <  0,  J1  > =  <  0, jTF  > 0, jEAR  <  0        [8] 
The intertemporal budget constraint model above focuses on determinants of the primary deficit. Based 
extensively on Hoelscher (1986), but on Barth, Iden, and Russek (1985) and Cebula (1988; 1997) as well, to explain 
the determination of the nominal interest rate yield on the long-term municipal bonds, including the impact of 
the primary deficit on same, a simple open-economy loanable funds model is adopted in which the long-term 
interest rate is determined by an equilibrium of the following form: 
D+C+M=S+PD [9] 
where: 
D = real domestic demand for long-term municipal bonds 
C = real net international capital inflows (as above) 
M2 = real domestic money supply growth (as above) 
S = real domestic supply of long-term municipal bonds 
PD = real net government borrowing, as measured by the primary budget deficit (as above) 
In this framework, it is expected 
D= D(EAR, EP, I, TF,...), DEAR < 0,DEP < 0, D1 > 0, DTF >0     [10] 
S = S(EAR, EP, TF,...), SEAR > 0, SEP > 0, STF < 0      [11] 
C = C(EAR,...), CEAR > 0         [12] 
 
Variable EP represents the expected future inflation rate. It is expected that, in principle paralleling Barth, 
Iden, and Russek (1985), Cebula (1988; 1997), and Hoelscher (1986), the real domestic demand for long term 
tax free municipal bonds is a decreasing function of the ex ante real short-term rate whereas the real domestic 
supply of long-term tax free municipal bonds is an increasing function of the ex ante real short-term taxable 
interest rate, ceteris paribus. These signs reflect the competition between long-term tax free markets and short 
term taxable markets. In addition, as suggested in Penner (1987, p. 123), it is expected that "...high real 
interest rates...would attract massive inflows of international capital;" this accounts for the expected positive 
sign on GEAR. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that nominal tax-free rates per se would have a major direct 
impact on net international capital inflows, given that they yield direct tax advantages to domestic (U.S.) citizens 
and firms. According to the conventional wisdom, the demand for bonds is a decreasing function of EP, 
whereas the supply of bonds would be an increasing function of EP, ceteris paribus. Next, the higher the 
federal income tax rate, the greater the demand for long term tax free municipals, as investors substitute tax 
free instruments for taxable ones, ceteris paribus. Finally, the demand for long term municipal bonds is an 
increasing function of the tax free interest rate yield, ceteris paribus, whereas the supply is a decreasing 
function of the tax free interest rate yield, ceteris paribus (conventional wisdom). 
Substituting equations [10], [11], and [12] into equation [9] and solving for EAR yields: 
TF = TF(PD, M2, C, EAR, I, EP)        [13]  
such that: 
TFPD > 0, TFM2 < 0, TFc < 0, TFEAR > 0, TF1< 0, TFEP > 0  [14] 
The first of these expected signs is positive in order to reflect the traditional argument that, when the 
government attempts to finance a budget deficit, it forces interest rates upwards as it competes with the 
private sector to attract funds from the financial markets, ceteris paribus. The expected negative sign on the 
second partial reflects the fact that a greater real money supply growth provides a larger source of loanable 
funds and indeed may act to offset the interest rate effects of budget deficits, ceteris paribus. The expected sign 
on the capital flows variable is negative because net capital inflows absorb debt issues and presumably help 
offset the effects of primary budget deficits [Cebula and Belton (1993)], ceteris paribus. The positive sign on 
TFEAR reflects the hypothesis that a higher ex ante real short term interest rate will force up the longer 
term tax free rate due to financial market competition, ceteris paribus. A higher federal income tax rate will 
act to raise the demand for tax free issues, thereby raising their prices and lowering their yields, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, per the conventional wisdom, the greater the expected inflation rate, the greater the long-term 
nominal interest rate yield, ceteris paribus. 
3. VARIABLES AND DATA 
The first step in the analysis is to develop an appropriate empirical measurement of expected inflation. This 
determination is essential to the specification of both variables EP and EAR. One possibility is to adopt the 
well-known Livingston survey data. However, as observed by Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti (1990, p. 
1013) there may be serious problems with the Livingston series: 
"Studies by some psychologists have shown that the heuristics people have available for forming 
expectations cannot be expected to automatically produce expectations that come anywhere close 
to satisfying the normative constraints on subjective probability judgments provided by the Bayesian 
theory...failure to obey these constraints makes Livingston...data incompatible with...stochastic 
law.. ." 
Accordingly, following the lead by Swamy, Kolluri, and Singamsetti (1990), rather than using the Livingston 
series, the study adopts a distributed lag model on actual inflation to construct the values for the expected 
inflation rate, EPt, for quarter t. In particular, to construct the values for EPt, a four-quarter distributed lag 
model of actual inflation (as measured by the annualized percent rate of change of the CPI, 1996=100.0) 
was used. 
Based on the framework expressed above, the following variables are included in the analysis: 
EPt = the expected inflation rate of the CPI in quarter t, expressed as a percent per annum 
EARt = the ex ante real average interest rate yield on 52 week U.S. Treasury bills in quarter t, expressed as a 
percent per annum (EAR' = the nominal average interest rate yield in quarter t on 52 week U.S. Treasury bills 
minus expected inflation) 
PDYt = the ratio of the seasonally adjusted nominal primary federal budget deficit in quarter t to the 
seasonally adjusted nominal GDP in quarter t, as a percent 
TFt = the nominal average interest rate yield on long-term Moody's Aaa-rated municipal (tax free) bonds, as a 
percent annum 
It = the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate in quarter t, as a percent 
M2t = the percent change in the seasonally adjusted real M2 money supply in quarter t, expressed at an 
annual rate 
CYt = the ratio of the seasonally adjusted nominal net international inflow of capital in quarter t to 
the seasonally adjusted nominal GDP in quarter t, as a percent. 
The primary deficit is scaled by the GDP level, as are net international capital inflows; th is is because 
the sizes of the deficit and international capital flows should both be judged relative to the size of the 
economy [Hoelscher (1986), Cebula (1997), Holloway (1986), Ostrosky (1990)]. The variable I t 
represents the personal income tax rate variable, I, in the model developed above. Since municipal 
bonds would clearly yield greater tax benefits to those individuals subject to the higher marginal 
federal personal income tax rate, It is simply the maximum marginal federal personal income tax rate. 
The study period, using quarterly data, is 1973.2-1996.4. 
The data sources are, as follows: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/data; 
The Council of Economic Advisors (1974, Table C-58; 1979, Table B-65; 1984, Table B-67; 1989, Table 
B71; 1992, Table B-69; 1995, Table B-72; 1998, Table B-71; 2002, Table B-73); 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Tables 1.1 and 3.2: 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp?Selected=N;   
Tax Facts, Urban Institute, Brookings Institution, 2002: 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.orq/TaxFacts/individual/schedule.cfm. 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The results of the Phillips Perron test for stationarity for each variable in levels and in first differences 
are reported in Table 1. The choice of lag length was determined using the Schwarz-Bayesian criterion. 
TABLE 1: PHILLIPS-PERRON UNIT ROOT TEST STATISTICS 
                            Variable     Levels        First Differences 
PDY -1.45 -10.08** 
TF -1.60 -5.06** 
EAR -2.00 -8.61** 
                                  I -1.79 -9.68** 
M2 -1.44 -8.56** 
EP -2.12 -4.51** 
CY -1.98 -8.52**  
**Statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The statistics in Table 1 reveal that all seven series in this analysis contain a unit root in levels, but are 
stationary in first differences. As a result, all causality tests must be performed in first 
differences. Furthermore, to determine the correct specification of the causality test, we must test 
for cointegration among the variables. This is accomplished using the Johansen (1990) cointegration 
test. To perform the cointegration test, we must first determine the appropriate lag-length to be used 
to estimate the VAR (Vector Auto-Regressive) model below: 
                p 
[Yt] = [a] Ʃ [bi][Yt-i] + [ut]          [15] 
                i=1 
where [ ] indicates a matrix, [a] is the matrix of constant terms, and [ut] is the matrix of stochastic error 
terms. The lag length p is so chosen that it minimizes the final prediction error using log-likelihood ratio 
tests and ensures that all ut are white noise. In the present model, p was determined to be 4. 
To begin the cointegration analysis, the results of the trace and maximum eigenvalue tests, using p = 4 
are provided in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2: BASIC COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS 
      Trace Test Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
           Rank            L.L.R.      1% c.v.       L.L.R. 1% c.v. 
           None                    142.46**  119.80              49.34**          47.15 
                                                    At most 1              90.12         90.45              36.54              41.00 
**Statistically significant at the one percent level.  
L.L.R. is log likelihood ratio and C.V. is critical value. 
Using the one percent level of significance as the appropriate criterion, the trace and maximum eigenvalue 
test statistics both reveal the existence of a single equation that describes the long run relationship among 
the seven variables in the model. Accordingly, testing for causality among the variables requires the use of 
the error-correction model (ECM), which in this case must be estimated including the cointegrating equation 
in order to avoid misspecification. Table 3 provides the coefficients and t-statistics for the normalized 
cointegrating equation. These results imply that the tax-free interest rate yield is positively related to the 
primary deficit. 
TABLE 3: NORMALIZED COINTEGRATION EQUATION 
    Variable    Results 
    Intercept   -6.21 
    TFt-1    1.00000 
    CYt-1    -71.44 
        (-0.97) 
    PDYt-1    -167.2** 
        (-8.39) 
    Lt-1    +1.67 
        (+3.27) 
    EPt-1    -3.38** 
        (-5.90) 
    M2t-1    +0.645# 
        (+1.77) 
    EARt-1    -1.068** 
        (-8.46) 
**Statistically significant at the one percent level;  
#Statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
The next step in the analysis is the estimation of the error-correction model (ECM) for the two emphasized 
variables in this study. Testing for causality between PDYt and TFt in the ECM requires not only checking the 
statistical significance of the lagged independent variables, but also checking the statistical significance of 
the error-correction terms. Thus, we proceed with testing for causality by estimating the full ECM used to test 
for cointegration. This ECM contains 4 lags of each exogenous variable, a constant, and the error-
correction term/equation (CointEq). The parameters of the ECM are estimated using OLS, correcting for 
heteroskedasticity using Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. 
 
5. ECM RESULTS 
The estimate for the primary deficit variable is: 
vPDYt = 0.07 - 0.05467vPDYt-1 + 0.2566vPDYt-2 + 0.116 vPDYt-3 + 0.092 vPDYt-4 
(-0.43) (+1.97)* (+0.88) (+0.83) 
 0.00027 vTFt-1 - 0.0014 vTFt-2 - 0.00002 vTFt.3 + 0.00062 vTFt-4  
(-0.19) (-1.15) (-0.02) (+0.50) 
 0.0033 vEARt-1 + 0.00093 vEARt-2- 0.00117 vEARt-3 - 0.00122 vEARt-4  
(-2.42)**     (+0.58)        (-0,85)            (-1.04) 
+ 0.3465 vCYt-1 - 0.086 vCYt-2 - 0.33998 vCYt-3 - 0.43684 vCYt-4 
 (+1.54) (-0.42)             (-1.56)                (-2.00)* 
 0.00128 vlt-1 + 0.0588 vlt-2 + 0.0204 vIt-3 + 0.04159 vIt-4  
(-0.07) (+3.12)**  (+0.89)            (+1.83)# 
 0.003 vEPt-1 - 0.0099 vEPt-2 + 0.0017 vEPt-3- 0.00477 vEPt-4  
(-0.60) (-1.61) (+0.32) (-0.84) 
- 0.0005 vM2t-1 + 0.0003 vM2t-2 - 0.00032 vM2t-3 - 0.00175 vM2t-4 + 0.00286 CointEg [16] 
 (-0.43) (+0.26) (-0.31)  (-1.87)# (+4.23)** 
R2 = 0.60, F=3.25, LI=365.79 
**Statistically significant at 1% level; *statistically significant at 5% level; #statistically 
significant at 10% level. Terms in parentheses are t-values and "v" is the first-differences 
operator. 
In equation [16], the estimated coefficient on the cointegrating equation is positive and significant at the 
one percent level. Furthermore, as shown in equation [16], the coefficients on the lagged vTF variables 
all fail to be statistically significant at acceptable levels. Thus, there is no compelling evidence 
whatsoever of any positive causal impact of the nominal tax free interest rate yield on the primary 
deficit. The estimate for the nominal tax-free interest rate yield is: 
 
vTFt = 0.02 + 38.56 vPDYt-1 + 26.44 vPDYt-2+ 33.83 vPDYt-3 + 32.1 vPDYt-4 
(+2.69)** (+1.80)# (+2.27)* (+2.55)** 
- 0.4629 vTFt-1 - 0.15 vTFt-2 - 0.4847 vTFt-3 - 0.3475 vTFt-4 
(-2.95)** (-1.11) (-3.53)** (-2.51)** 
+ 0.53 vEARt-1 + 0.1856 vEARt-2 + 0.0907 vEARt-3 + 0.3528 vEARt-4 
(+3.46)** (+1.01) (+0.58) (+2.67)** 
+ 12.578 vCYt-1 - 37.41 vCYt-2+ 23.535 vCYt-3- 2.31 vCYt-4  
(+0.50)  (-1.60)            (+0.96)          (-0.09) 
+ 1.70 vlt-1 - 1.76 vIt-2 - 0.24 vlt-3 - 3.1298 vlt-4 
 (+0.86) (-0.82) (-0.09)        (-1.22) 
+ 1.41 vEPt-1 + 1.41 vElpt-2 - 0.399 vEPt-3 + 1.60 vEPt-4  
(+2.48)*   (+2.02)* (-0.66) (+2.51)* 
 
 0.3057 vM2t-1 + 0.083 vM2t-2 - 0.31 vM2t-3 + 0.0955 vM2t-4+ 0.206 CointEq  
 (-2.24)*             (+0.62)        (-2.68)** (+0.90)               (+2.69)**  
 R2 = 0.50, F= 2.22, LI=-59.77        [17] 
 
To begin with, in equation [17], the estimated coefficient on the cointegrating equation is positive and 
significant at the one percent level. In addition, the coefficients on vPDYt-1, vPDYt-3 and VPDYt-4 are 
statistically significant at the one, five, and one percent levels, respectively, with positive signs. Based on 
these results, it appears that the primary budget deficit positively caused the nominal interest rate yield 
on long term high grade tax free municipals over the study period. For the interested reader, based on 
the results in estimate [17], the nominal tax free interest rate yield also appears to have been positively 
caused by the ex ante real short term interest rate and expected inflation, whereas it appears to have 
been negatively caused by monetary policy. 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The conventional wisdom argues that, ceteris paribus, the federal budget deficit acts to elevate the nominal long 
term rate of interest. Despite the appearance and high visibility of Ricardian Equivalence arguments and studies 
based thereupon, a number of studies in recent years have provided empirical support for the conventional wisdom. 
The present study has used cointegration and error-correction model (ECM) techniques to investigate the causality 
relationship between the federal budget deficit and the nominal tax free interest rate yield on long-term municipal 
bonds. To avoid a possible misspecification, (1) the primary budget deficit, which excludes Treasury net interest 
payments, is adopted as the federal budget deficit measure, (2) a federal income tax rate measure is included in the 
system, and (3) net international capital flows are included in the analysis. The use of the primary deficit permits 
evaluation of whether there may exist economic reasons (above and beyond interest simply paid on the national debt) 
for an impact of the nominal long term interest rate on the budget deficit. Emphasis on the nominal tax free interest 
rate yield on long-term municipal reflects (a) the comparative lack of attention on this interest rate measure in this 
literature and (b) the need for policymakers to better understand the impact of federal budget deficit conditions 
and policies on state and local government finances. 
In this study, strong empirical support based on the ECM estimation is provided indicating that the primary budget 
deficit does act to raise the nominal interest rate yield on long term high grade municipals. However, there is no 
evidence that the tax free interest rate yield influences the primary deficit. Thus, it appears that there does not exist a 
bi-directional relationship between the nominal tax free interest rate yield on long-term municipal bonds and the primary 
budget deficit of the federal government over the 1973:2-1996.4 study period. 
In conclusion, it appears that factors elevating the primary federal budget deficit act to raise the cost of municipal 
borrowing, presumably through increasing the competition for loanable funds. This confirms the validity of Alan 
Krueger's (2003) statement that federal deficits cause interest rates to rise. Moreover, federal government policies that 
affect the primary budget deficit cannot be viewed in a vacuum since they impact profoundly on the finances of state 
and local governments and the agencies and commissions thereof. 
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